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Legal Backlash: The Expanding Liability of
Women Who Fail to Protect Their Children from
Their Male Partner's Abuse
Linda J. Panko *
Introduction
Although child abuse has existed for centuries in the United States, an
increase in the number of reported incidents in recent yearsl has spurred
legislative and judicial response, primarily in the form of "failure-toprotect" laws. 2 Failure-to-protect laws impose liability upon parents, who
have a duty to protect their child, when they fail to prevent abuse of the
child at the hands of a known offender. 3 Child abuse statutes generally
appear in two forms: commission statutes,4 which are used to convict

• J.D., DePaul University School of Law, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., Chatham College,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The author works as an attorney for the U.S. Department of
Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Chicago, IL. She is a member of Chicago Feminist Law
Professors and Friends.
I. The number of reported child abuse cases rose to nearly 3 million in 1992, compared
to 2.7 million in 1991. Of the number of reported deaths resulting from abuse, neglect
accounted for 36% of cases; physical abuse was responsible for 58%. 1 Million Young
Victims - And Counting, USA TODAY, April 7, 1994, at 2A (citing statistics gathered by the
National Committee for Prevention of Child Abuse and National Coalition for Child
Protection Reform). In 1984, Congress passed the Child Abuse Amendments, which
appropriated funds for the research, prevention, and treatment of abuse and neglect only to
states with child abuse reporting laws. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (Supp. 1985). Reporting
statutes require specific professionals dealing with children to report suspected child abuse
or neglect cases to the proper authorities. All fifty states comply with child abuse reporting
requirements.
2. See Anne T. Johnson, Criminal Liability for Parents Who Fail to Protect, 5 J. LAW
& lNEQ. 359, 368 (1987).
3. See generally S. Randall Humm, Criminalizing Poor Parenting Skills as a Means to
Contain Violence By and Against Children, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1123 (1991). I use the term
"failure-to-protect laws" to encompass child abuse, neglect, aiding and abetting, and
involuntary homicide laws when they are used to punish a parent's omission regarding his
or her parental duty.
4. See, e.g., 720 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 720, para. 51l2-4.3(a) (Smith-Hurd 1992) ("Any
person of the age 18 years and upwards who intentionally or knowingly, and without legal
justification and by any means, causes great bodily harm or permanent disability or
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those who actually inflict abuse (active abusers), and omission statutes,S
which criminalize the passive conduct of those who expose a child to a risk
of maltreatment or fail to protect or care for a child when they have an
affrrmative duty to do so (passive perpetrators).6 A court's inquiry when
applying an omission statute focuses on whether the passive perpetrator had
notice of ongoing abuse and allowed the abuse to continue. A passive
perpetrator's liability for child abuse or homicide, if the abuse is the direct
cause of the child's death, is predicated upon a finding of several factors:
(1) a legal duty to protect the child; 7 (2) actual or constructive notice of
the foreseeability of abuse; (3) the child's exposure to abuse; and (4) failure
to prevent such abuse. Parents can fulfill their legal duty to protect their
children in the face of abuse by reporting the abuse to authorities, removing
the child from the abusive situation, or ejecting the abuser from the child's
home. Statutes which criminalize passive conduct aim to protect children's
"best interests" by compelling parents to remove their children from
abusive environments.
Several problematic themes can be identified in failure-to-protect case
law: an overwhelming number of defendants are women; women
defendants frequently are portrayed as "bad mothers;" and courts often fail
to address underlying problems of abuse. Failure-to-protect laws have a
disparate impact on women because men are more frequently active
abusers 8 and women often cannot protect themselves or their children from
a male partner's abuse. Women fail to protect their children for many
reasons, including (1) fear of retaliation by the abuser; (2) economic

disfigurement to any child ... commits the offense of aggravated battery of a child.").
5. See, e.g., Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4304 (1983) (endangering a child's welfare is
committed "by violating a duty of care, protection or support").
6. See generally John Kleinig, Criminal Liability for Failures to Act, 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 169 (1986). Thirty-five states include liability for omissions in their
child abuse statutes thereby recognizing the parental duty to care for and protect children.
See also People v. Benway, 164 Cal. App. 3d 505, 511 (4th Dist. 1985) ("[W]e conclude
all forms of felony child abuse whether 'assaultive,' 'nonassaultive,' 'active,' or 'passive,'
constitute a 'single course of conduct with a single purpose' ... Thus when death occurs,
the act or omission to act merges into the homicide.") (quoting People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d
375, 387 (1971».
7. "The common law imposes affirmative duties upon persons standing in certain
personal relationships to other person &-upon parents to aid their small children. . . . Thus
a parent may be guilty of criminal homicide for failure to call a doctor for his sick child,
a mother for failure to prevent the fatal beating of her baby by her lover, a husband for
failure to aid his imperiled wife. . . . Action may be required to thwart the threatened perils
of nature (e.g., to combat sickness, to ward off starvation or the elements); or it may be
required to protect against threatened acts by third persons." W. LAFAVE & A. SCarf,
CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3, 203-04 (2d ed. 1986). Note the gender-specific designation; e.g., "a
mother for failure to prevent the fatal beating of her baby . . . ."
8. Flynn McRoberts & John Gorman, Child Abuse Often Points to Boyfriend, Cm. TRIB.,
Mar. 11, 1993 (abuse by boyfriends is far more common than abuse by girlfriends,
according to experts).
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dependence on the male abuser; (3) emotional dependence on the male
abuser, including the phenomenon of "learned helplessness;,,9 and (4)
family or legal pressures, such as fear that children will be taken from
them, or issues relating to undocumented alien status. With these factors
in mind, the inadequacy of the legal system's current approach to the
protection of children becomes clear.
It is crucial to understand the causes of recent statutory developments
and the legal background from which these developments emerge so as to
facilitate the redress of the statutes' failures. Part I of this work examines
how failure-to-protect statutes' disparate impact on women is the result of
a legal backlash against the growing independence of women. Part II
examines the traditional backdrop upon which failure-to-protect laws have
been promulgated and interpreted and contrasts this backdrop with the
modem trends ignored by these laws. Finally, Part III suggests how
legislatures and the jUdiciary can better serve the best interests of abused
children and mothers.

I. Mothers as Passive Perpetrators
A.

THE EXPANSION OF PARENS PATRIAE AND ITS NEGATNE IMPACT ON
MOTHERS

The American legal system traditionally has accorded men great
deference regarding the upbringing and discipline of children. lO This
deference stems from the fact that for most of history, children, like
women, were viewed as chattel with virtually no independent rights of their
own. Over time, the privacy and autonomy accorded to men to run their
families as they see fit has come to be delicately balanced against societal
concerns regarding the welfare of children. Parental obligations have been
summarized as follows:
It is the right and duty of parents, under the law of nature as well

as the common law and the statutes of many states, to protect their
children, to care for them in sickness and in health, and to do
whatever may be necessary for their care, maintenance, and
preservation, including medical attendance, if necessary. An
omission to do this is a public wrong which the state, under its
police powers, may prevent. I I

9. It is ironic that passivity, a character trait once generally considered desirable in
females, can now fonn the basis of criminal liability.
10. See, e.g., Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639 n.l8 (1979) (parents have a
constitutional right to be free from ''undue, adverse interference by the State").
11. 59 AM. JUR. 20, Parent and Child, § 14 (1987).
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In Parham v. J.R., 12 Chief Justice Burger articulated the long-held view
of the u.s. Supreme Court, that "[o]ur jurisprudence historically has
reflected Western Civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad
parental authority over minor children.,,13 This traditional, hands-off
approach has been encroached upon by the expanding doctrine of parens
patriae.
Through the use of this doctrine, the state increasingly has intervened
in the parent-child relationship. Assessing the recent expansion of parens
patriae, as designed and implemented by the male-dominated legislature
and judiciary, it is clear that the female-headed household is not accorded
the same respect and deference as the traditional male-headed household.
In light of the increasing commonality of female-headed households, this
legal intrusion into family life may be viewed as a form of legal backlash
against women who raise children without men. This backlash results from
women's defiance of men's desire for dominance - dominance manifested
and maintained, inter alia, by the traditional structure of male-headed
households.
Increasing legal intrusion is evidenced by the recent evolution of
failure-to-protect laws and parental-responsibility laws. For instance,
failure-to-protect laws have been expanded to hold mothers civilly liable for
failing to protect their children from their husband's sexual abuse. In 1993,
two daughters who had been sexually abused by their father won a $3.4
million award against both parents. The court ordered their mother to
contribute half the amount because she was also found negligent in
allowing the abuse to occur. 14 Counsel for the mother's insurance
company remarked that "Two years ago, any of this would have been
unusual. ... I'm seeing more and more cases across the country of
mothers' being brought in for negligent supervision. ,,15

12. 442 u.S. 584 (1979).
13. Id. at 602.
14. See Mark Hansen, Liability for Spouse's Abuse: New Theory Holds Mothers
Accountable for Failing to Protect Children, A.S.A. J., Feb. 1993, at 16.
15. Todd 1. Gillman, Sex Abuse Suit Worry for Insurers; Mom, Stepdad Ordered to Pay
Kids $3.4 Million, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Nov. 1, 1992. See also Hansen, supra note 14,
at 16.
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Parental responsibility laws I6 punish parents who fail to control their
children's misconduct, operating with the implicit assumption that parents
can actually control the behavior of their children. I7 Parental liability
statutes originally were intended to make parents responsible for their
children's juvenile delinquency, vandalism, and malicious mischief. 18
More recently, however, these laws have become the bases of liability not
only for property damage but also for damages resulting from personal
injury. 19 It is easy for a parent to be held liable under these statutes. A
case in point is that of the single motherO who was the first parent
arrested under a California anti-gang law which subjects parents to criminal
liability for failing "to exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection, and
control over their minor child.,,21 Initially the police questioned the
woman about her fifteen-year-old son's role in a gang rape. Then, upon
discovering gang memorabilia in her home, they proceeded to arrest her.
The prosecutor claimed that this evidence demonstrated that she "'failed as
a parent because it showed she knew about her son's gang affiliation,
condoned it and may have even participated in his gang. ",22 The woman
stated that she had tried to discipline her son and had even enrolled him in
an alternative-education program that provided classes for high school
students expelled for criminal activity or bad conduct. She observed:

16. See, e.g., Joseph P. Shapiro, When Parents Pay for Their Kids' Sins, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REp., July 24, 1989, at 26 (listing the following state parental-responsibility laws:
Wisconsin and Hawaii: imposing child-support payments when their children have babies;
Arkansas: imposing fines on parents when children skip school; Florida: imprisoning if child
injures another with a gun left accessible by a parent; Ohio: imposing fines or jail sentences
for parents who encourage drug use or whose children are truant; 29 states and the District
of Columbia: evicting families from public housing if child uses or sells drugs. See
generally Humm, supra note 3.
17. See, e.g., State v. Hamilton, 501 A.2d 778, 779 (Del. 1985) (stating that Delaware
"statutes and the caselaw imposing liability presume the obvious, that in our culture, the
parent ofa child, with whom that child resides, has control over the child"), ajf'd, 515 A2d
397 (Del. 1986); Illinois Parental Responsibility Law, "The legislative purpose of this Act
is twofold: (1) to compensate innocent victims of juvenile misconduct that is willful or
malicious; and, (2) to place upon parents the obligation to control a minor child so as to
prevent intentional harm to others"). Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 740 para. 115/1 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
At common law, parents are not liable for the torts of their children, unless the children
were acting as agents of the parents or the common law was changed by statute. 67 A
c.J.S., Parent & Child, § 123 (1978).
18. 8 AL.R. 3d 612, 615 (1966).
19. See, e.g., Distinctive Printing & Packaging v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Neb.
1989).
20. The mother, long separated from her husband, had taken sole responsibility of her
three children and worked as an assembly-line supervisor. Ginger Thompson, 'I Did All I
Could to Help My Son: ' Mother Arrested Under Gang Law Denies Blame, L.A TIMES, May
31, 1989, at 1.
21. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1991).
22. Thompson, supra note 20, at 1.
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How could the police know about all the things I have done to try
to help my son .... [a]ll they see is a bunch of pictures of a party
and some writing on the wall. They don't see everything my
family has gone through. . .. [I] considered quitting my job to
keep closer watch on my kids, but we could have never made it on
welfare .... If they put me in jail, then what's going to happen to
my kids? Is that going to solve the problem?23
If convicted, the woman could have been sentenced to a year in prison with
a maximum fine of $2,500. The charges were dropped, however, when
police discovered that she had attended a parenting course and received a
certificate for successful completion, and that she had tried to discipline her
son and steer him away from joining a gang. While she may have been an
ineffective parent, she had done all that she could under the circumstances.
Referring to the sudden popularity of parental-responsibility laws, one
commentator noted that
[t]his trend raises the question of why the state now has decided to
involve itself in a domain that has for so long been considered the
exclusive province of the family. . .. [T]hese laws arise from
frustration with two related problems: (l) the state's inability to
contain juvenile lawlessness, and (2) the welfare of children who
are victims of violence and abuse. 24
Although correct in his assessment of the initial concerns spurring
legislative change, this commentator's explanations only scratch the swface
of these complex issues without examining the crucial correlative, societal
factors. While the inherent appeal of justifications such as those articulated
by the commentator make the unacceptable results of the application of
parental responsibility laws seem more tolerable, one must be cautious in
accepting such a simple premise at face value.
Single mothers who raise children without the sanction of male-defined
institutions, such as marriage and the nuclear family, threaten these
traditional patriarchal strongholds. When a man cohabits with a woman
and her children, he is no longer the "property owner." His status is more
akin to that of a passing guest or interloper. The man's ability to control
what was traditionally his property - women and children - is thus
frustrated. Women who raise children without men not only reject and
refuse to conform with male institutions, they also threaten men by
demonstrating their ability to raise children without a father figure.

23. Id.
24. Humm, supra note 3, at 1130.
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Fear has been used as a potent weapon in the backlash against
autonomous women. In the 1980s, popular news was replete with stories
and studies which struck at themes traditionally thought of as significant for
women: children and male partners. In her recent book Backlash: The
Undeclared War Against American Women, Susan Faludi notes, among the
copious manifestations of backlash against working mothers, the horror
stories promoted by the news media. She describes two feature articles
published in Newsweek within a two-week period. 25 The first article
described child abuse in child care centers as "epidemic." Two weeks later,
a second issue carried the cover story, What Price Day Care?, complete
with a picture of a frightened child sucking his thumb and a contrasting
eight-page article entitled, At Home by Choice, featuring a former bond
seller who traded her career for motherhood and wifedom .. Faludi also
notes articles in the New York Times Magazine, Savry, and Newsweek
which proclaim that an increasing number of women choose to stay at
home rather than pursue careers, though the articles conspicuously lack
federal labor statistics to support such assertions.
In contrast to the obvious route taken by "pro-family values" conservatives, the media deluged audiences with studies, stories, statistics, and polls
on "the man shortage" and women's "biological clocks." The media made
sure that women knew more than they ever wanted to know about their
slim chances of marriage after age thirty and the many dangers of giving
birth after age forty. Feminism was depicted not as a beacon of selfdetermination, but rather as self-gratification at the expense of children,
husbands, family, values and morals, and, as such, a primary reason for the
rise in crime, abuse, and angst. .Most importantly, the press was
the first to set forth and solve for a mainstream audience the
paradox in women's lives, the paradox that would become so
central to the backlash: women have achieved so much yet feel so
dissatisfied; it must be feminism's achievements, not society's
resistance to these partial achievements, that is causing women all
this pain.26
The media had become forthright in placing the "blame on Mame."

25. SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN
42 (1991). See also Husbands No, Babies Yes, NEWSWEEK, July 26, 1993, at 53 (reporting
the dramatic increase of single mothers choosing motherhood, accompanied by a statistical
chart with a Where's Poppa? Not Here heading and juxtaposed with an article on a sexabuse trial involving a day-care center)~ Daughters ofMurphy Brown, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2,
1993, at 58 (discussing the same U.S. Census Bureau report as the article one week earlier,
this time as part of an issue on teen violence).
26. FALum, supra note 25, at 42.
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MOTHERS

At the root of the belief that mothers who fail to protect their children
are morally reprehensible, and thus criminally punishable, lies a condemnation not so much of their failure to perform acts of a physical nature but
rather of their failure to perform acts of love - the way mothers should
love their children?7 A mother's love for her child is the most-revered
form of love, which knows no bounds; i.e., it overcomes all physical,
financial, emotional, and moral obstacles. Where such obstacles actually
do limit a woman's ability to protect her child, they are not recognized as
"obstacles" and are thus not considered relevant or legitimate factors in
adjudicating guilt for failure-to-protect. For instance, a Maryland court,
outraged by a fifteen-year-old mother's negligence, affirmed her involuntary
manslaughter conviction. 28 The court held that her boyfriend's propensity
for violence was such that it would put an ordinary, prudent person on
notice of endangerment to the child and that she "easily could, and should,
have removed Terry [her daughter] from this danger. ,,29 Her failure to do
so was sufficient to support a finding that her gross and criminal negligence
was a contributing cause of the child's death. The court's curt dismissal
of the fifteen-year-old mother's possible economic and emotional
dependence on her boyfriend, and her fear of retaliation by him, is
probative of the little weight given to such factors.
The court's focus on the mother's capability to "properly" raise
children in the absence of a male charge exposes the way in which the
male-legal system30 holds women to a male-defined standard of "good
mother" conduct. While men have also been convicted for failing to
protect their children from abuse inflicted by mothers, these cases, like
cases of male rape, are the exception, not the norm. 31 Failure-to-protect
laws have a disparate impact on women32 because women held liable
under such laws are unfairly judged from a standpoint of male bias

27. See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of
Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 520 (1992).
28. Palmer v. State, 164 A.2d 467 (Md. 1960).
29. [d. at 474 (emphasis added).
30. FALUOl, supra note 25, at 8 (reporting that less than 8% of all federal and state
judges and less than 6% of all law partners are women.)
31. See, e.g. Michael v. State, 767 P.2d 193 (Alaska App. 1988); State v. Portigue, 481
A.2d 534 (N.H. 1984); State v. Adams, 557 P.2d 586 (N.M. Ct.App. 1976).
32. See Evan Stark and Anne E. Flitcraft, Women and Children at Risk: A Feminist
Perspective on Child Abuse, 18 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES 97,98-100 (1988) (reporting that
men are more likely than women to batter their children, particularly men who batter their
wives); DAVID G. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 116 (1970) (study finding fathers or
father substitutes were perpetrators in nearly two-thirds of child abuse incidents. Although,
in absolute numbers, slightly more children were abused by mothers than fathers, 29.5% of
children were living in homes without father figures.)
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predicated upon an effort to coerce women to conform to patriarchal
concepts of "motherhood."
A central component, if not the keystone, of the nuclear family, is the
ideal of motherhood, which embodies an unrealistic and oppressive
standard. As Chesler points out, "[m]others are expected to perform a
series of visible and non-visible tasks, all of which are never-ending.
Mothers are not allowed to fail any of these obligations. The ideal of
motherhood is sacred; it exposes all mothers as imperfect.,,33 The "good
mother" is expected to sacrifice herself for the greater good of her family
by nurturing, caring, and taking responsibility for children and home.
Within the nuclear family, it is still considered natural that mothers have
a special bond with their children while fathers remain distant. "Mothers'
love is unconditional and nurturing; fathers' love is earned.,,34 Traditionally, a mother's raison d'etre was to be nurturer,3s caretaker, and homemaker. These personal, uncompensated and disempowering sacrifices are
simply expected of mothers. 36
When a mother acts contrary to this ideal of motherhood, courts often
portray her as a "bad mother" and thus deserving of punishment. In State
v. Palmer,37 the court juxtaposed the mother's heartless response to her
baby's death with her concern for her paramour, making her sound all the
more deserving of punishment for being a bad mother:
The doctor arrived within minutes and found the infant dead.
Appellant made no show of emotion but repeated eight or ten times
that McCue [the abuser] could not have done it, and asked if
McCue would be all right and what would happen to McCue ....
[S]he was not crying nor very upset. He asked her why she had
allowed the beating to go on. She said that there was nothing she
could do about it. ... When reunited after separate questioning,
they went into a "love scene."

33. PHYLLIS CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL 50 (1986).
34. Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REv.
LAW & WOMEN'S STUDIES 133, 136 (1992).
35. References to the relationship between human beings and their natural surroundings
as ''mother earth" and "mother nature" are indicative of the nurturing and caretaking traits
attributed to women.
36. Mothers continue to be the primary caretakers of children and as such their ability
to become financially or professionally independent or equal to men is significantly
impeded. Becker, supra note 34, at 157 (citing VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR
ECONOMIC EQUALITY 4 (1988»; see also Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Sex
Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1311 (1989) (average woman will devote more
time to child rearing than the average man, resulting in lower lifetime earnings).
37. 164 A.2d 467 (Md. 1960).
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The first tear Sgt. Lowe saw appellant shed was after her
mother had arrived.... 38
In State v. Stanciel and State v. Peter;9 (consolidated on appeal), the
Illinois Supreme Court held that mothers may be convicted, under the
Illinois accountability statute, of aiding and abetting40 the murder of their
children resulting from their partners' abuse. 41 Both women received the
same sentences (sixty and thirty years, respectively) as their boyfriends,
who actually committed the murders, for their failure to prevent the harm.
While Barbara Peters was not present when the fatal beating of her son
occurred, the fact that she permitted the abuser to have exclusive care of
her son constituted aid. Peters was far from the court's image of an ideal
mother. The court's opinion portrays her as a "bad mother,'~2 noting that
on the evening of the fatal occurrence, Peters had gone out drinking with
a friend and failed to look in on her son that evening. 43 Ms. Peters' living
situation, which involved working two jobs, 5 p.m. to midnight on
weekdays and bartending on weekends to support her son and boyfriend,
was not taken into consideration by the court. Instead, it focused on her
reaction to hearing that her son had been murdered: "Peters just shrugged
her shoulders and gave [the detective] a look as if it did not matter. Peters
told Baldwin [the detective] she had not really wanted the boy. When
Baldwin asked her whether she did not really care what happened to
Bobby, [her son] Peters responded, 'I guess not."~ The court did,
however, go on to note that "Peters did tell Baldwin she loved Bobby and
that she would never allow someone to abuse the boy or to deliberately

38. Id. at 471-72.
39. 606 N.E.2d 1201 (Ill. 1992) (consolidated on appeal).
40. See also State of North Carolina v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780 (N.C. 1982), revg 280
S.E.2d 505 (N.C. App. 1981) (upholding mother's sentence for aiding and abetting child
abuse for failing to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm).
41. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 720, para. 5/5-2 (Smith-Hurd 1992),jormerly Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987,
ch. 38, § 5-2 (Smith-Hurd 1989). The relevant section of the current statute states: "When
accountability exists. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when ...
(c) Either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or
facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other
person in the planning or commission of the offense."
42. See Peters, 586 N.E.2d 469,472 (Ill. 1991), ajJ'd, 606 N.E.2d 1201 (1992) (appellate
court quoting the babysitter's comment that "the defendant did not love Bobby 'the way a
mother should love a child"').
43. Peters, 606 N.E.2d at 1208.
44. Id.

-
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hurt him.,,45 Peters seemingly was sentenced to thirty years not only for
failure-to-protect but also for failure to be a "good mother."
Like Peters, Violetta Burgos, the mother accused in Stanciel, did not
conform with the image of an all-loving and all-caring mother. Burgos had
lost custody of her child when her boyfriend broke the child's leg, but
regained custody on the condition that she refrain from contact with the
boyfriend. However, she not only continued the relationship, but also
allowed her boyfriend to discipline her son. The appellate court found that
while Burgos may have been guilty of neglect, the evidence did not show
that she had ever permitted her boyfriend to beat the child. 46 The court
held that "[h]er mere presence during the beating is insufficient to find that
she aided the commission of murder.'~7 The lllinois Supreme Court,
however, reversed, finding that her conduct was sufficient to support a
finding of common criminal design. As a result of Burgos's and Peters's
failure to protect their children, they were convicted not simply for child
neglect, but rather for aiding and abetting murder.

II. Recognizing the Obstacles to a Mother's Control of Her
Family
A.

PARENTAL STANDARDS FOR MOTHERS DIFFER FROM THOSE FOR
FATHERS

Society's standards of parenting for fathers are vastly different from
those it holds for mothers. Accordingly, women are adjudged by the harsh
standard established for "good mothers," while men who fail-to-protect
their children benefit from a much lower standard. While mothers are
expected to devote themselves to their children, fathers who do so are
considered rather extraordinary, going above and beyond the call of duty.
For example, one working mother described her husband's experience while
raising the children:
You won't believe the offers of help John had when he kept the
children last year while I finished school. People at the church and
in the neighborhood brought cooked food, or invited him and the
children to supper two or three times a month. He had offers all

45. Id. This ambivalence is not uncommon among mothers who feel the stress and
frustration of working and raising a child alone, along with resentment toward the child and
guilt for not meeting the expectations of the ideal mother. See Becker, supra note 34, at
145 (quoting MARILYN FRENCH, HER MOTHER'S DAUGHTER 617 (1987) ("[W]omen caught,
trapped, bewildered by motherhood, impaled forever on their ambivalence--love and
resentment in almost equal proportions"».
46. State v. Elijah Stanciel, 589 N.E.2d 557, 565 (III. App. 1991),rev 'd 606 N.E.2d 1201
(1992).
47. Id.
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the time to babysit or do laundry or help clean house. They all
thought it was so wonderful that he was doing this thing - as if
the children were his as much as mine. Don't get me wrong. I
thought it was wonderful, too, but not any more than if I did it. I
never had any offers like he got. I guess I'm doing what I'm
supposed to do. 48
Although this example is based on a married couple, the situation is
illustrative of how fathers are treated more favorably than mothers for
carrying out their parental duties.
Judicial application of these different parental standards is exemplified
by two Wisconsin cases, State. v. Williquette 49 and State v. Rundle. so In
Williquette, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the mother's leaving
her two children in the care of their father and failing to stop his abuse was
sufficient overt conduct to convict the mother of child abuse, as if she had
directly abused the children herself. While the Court of Appeals held that
she could be liable for aiding and abetting the crime of child abuse,sl the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that she could also be directly liable for the
crime, under Section 940.201 of the Wisconsin child abuse statute
outlawing behavior that "subjects a child to cruel mistreatment. ,,52
Although the statute did not expressly cover those who knowingly place
children in situations where abuse is likely,S3 the court broadly construed
"subjects" to cover acts beyond those of a direct abuser. "Subjects" was
interpreted to mean not only abusive behavior, but also exposure of the
child to foreseeable risks of abuse by a person who has a duty to care for

48. WOMEN AS SINGLE PARENTS: CONFRONTING INSTITIJTIONAL BARRIERS IN THE
COURTS, THE WORKPLACE, AND THE HOUSING MARKET 85 (Elizabeth A. Mulroy, ed.,
1988).
49. 385 N.W.2d 145 (Wis. 1986); superseded by statute, State v. Rundle, 500 N.W.2d
916 (Wis. 1993).
50. 500 N.W.2d 916 (Wis. 1993).
51. Williquette, 370 N.W.2d 282 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (state did not raise the issue of
aiding and abetting).
52. 385 N.W.2d at 147; Wis. Stat Ann. § 940.201 (1985), repealed by § 948.03(2)(3)
(1987). The relevant section of the statute states: "Whoever tortures a child or subjects a
child to cruel maltreatment, including but not limited, to severe bruising, lacerations,
fractured bones, bums, internal injuries or any injury constituting great bodily harm under
sec. 939.22(14) is guilty of a Class E felony. In this section, 'child' means a person under
16 years of age."
53. See Williquette, 385 N.W.2d at 158 n.2 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting). Colorado,
Florida, and Nevada are examples of states with express provisions covering persons who
knowingly endanger children by placing them in situations where abuse is likely to occur.
For example, "A person commits child abuse if he causes an injury to a child's health or
permits a child to be unreasonably placed in a situation which poses a threat of injury to
the child's life or health." Colo. Rev. Stat § 18-6-401(1) (1986). See also Williquette, 385
N.W.2d at 148-149 (holding that § 940.201 only applies to those who intentionally and
directly abuse a child and thus granted the defendant's motion to dismiss).
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the child. Williquette's leaving the children with their father while she
worked54 was held to constitute one of the direct causes of abuse (overt
conduct), not simply an omission. Although she did not directly abuse her
children, Williquette was bound over for a felony trial with a potential twoyear prison sentence. Chief Justice Heffernan, dissenting, characterized the
majority's holding as an "emotional catharsis" rather than an interpretation
of the law. 55 Furthermore, Heffernan rejected the majority's position that
the legislature intended the statute to reach acts of omission and objected
to what he saw as the equation of two unlike acts. 56
Williquette's potentially severe sentence is particularly disconcerting
in light of State v. Danforth,57 decided the same day. The Danforth
defendant, the mother's live-in boyfriend, was the direct perpetrator of child
abuse when he fatally perforated the child's intestine. His defense, that he
was assisting the boy's vomiting and had not intended to hurt him, was
rejected by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which held that specific intent
to harm the child was not an element of the child abuse statute. This male
defendant, who was the direct abuser and cause of the child's death, was
convicted of a Class E felony, which carries a fine not to exceed $10,000
or a prison sentence not to exceed two years, or both - roughly the same
penalty which the mother in Williquette faced. 58 Was the wrong committed by Williquette (failure-to-protect from a known abuser) comparable to
the wrong committed by Danforth (actual physical abuse inflicted upon a
child leading to death)? Attaching the same punishment for these "two
unlike acts" is outrageously disproportionate. Williquette, like Peters, not
only was punished for her failure to stop her husband's abuse, but also for
being a "bad mother."
In State v. Rundle,59 a case involving a father as the defendant, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court revisited the interpretation of "subjects'mo in the
context of the revised child abuse statute. Rundle had been convicted for
aiding and abetting the intentional and reckless physical abuse inflicted by
his wife upon his three-and-a-half-year old daughter. Despite the fact that
he was aware of the danger, had an opportunity to act, and failed to protect
the child, his conviction was reversed. Rundle's conduct was more

54. When the court noted that she left childcare to her husband when she had to go out,
it stated that "she allegedly was at work." Williquette, 385 N.W.2d at 148.
55. Id. at 156 (Heffernan, C.]., dissenting).
56. Id. See also Nancy A. Tanck, Commendable or Condemnable? Criminal Liability
For Parents Who Fail to Protect Their Children From Abuse, 1987 WIS. L. REv. 659
(1987).
57. 385 N.W.2d 125 (Wis. 1986) (holding that specific intent is not an element of child
abuse under the Wisconsin child abuse statute).
58. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.50(3)(e) (1985).
59. 500 N.W.2d 916 (Wis. 1993).
60. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.201 (1985), repealed by § 948.03(2)(3) (1987).
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egregious than Williquette's in that he was present during the continuing
abuse, underwent parental training when his child was removed from his
home twice for abuse, and repeatedly lied to medical personnel regarding
the baby's injuries (arguably affirmative, overt conduct). The child had
been admitted to a hospital on several occasions for bruises, scratches, cuts
and ultimately for "shaken baby syndrome." There was also, however,
evidence that the father had a loving relationship with the child and was
her primary caretaker. 61
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the state failed to prove that
the defendant undertook the affirmative action against the victim required
for him to be convicted of aiding and abetting physical child abuse. The
state could not avoid the "failing-to-act" provision by charging the
defendant with intentional and reckless child abuse as an aider and abettor
without proving "conduct, either verbal or overt, that as a matter of
objective fact aids another person in the execution of a crime.'~2 The
court distinguished Williquette, in which the mother's similar failure to
prevent abuse was sufficient to uphold het conviction for child abuse under
Section 940.201 63 and for aiding and abetting, by examining the revised,
post- Williquette child abuse statute. The revised statute clarified the
ambiguous "subjects to" statutory language at issue in Williquette by adding
the clause "failure to act exposes the child to an unreasonable risk of great
bodily harm.... '~ Unlike other state statutes on child abuse, the revised
Wisconsin statute expressly subjects parents to criminal prosecution for
failing to protect their children from abuse in addition to the general
provisions for intentional and reckless physical child abuse. A plurality of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court's statement
that the defendant may have been guilty under the "failing-to-act"
provision, but that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt as an
aider and abettor.
The dissent's analysis is similar to that of the Illinois Supreme Court
in Peters and Stanciel in asserting that the defendant's omission intentionally failing to stop the abuse - did rise to the level of an
affrrmative, overt act. 65 The dissent charges that the plurality did not
distinguish Rundel's conduct from Williquette's, which constituted "overt
conduct" sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting. The court depicted

61. Rundle, 500 N.W.2d at 919.
62. Id. at 924.
63. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.201 (1985), repealed by § 948.03(2)(3) (1987).
64. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 948.03(4)(a) (West Supp. 1990).
65. The plurality attempted to distinguish Rundle from the Illinois decision, by stating
that the Wisconsin legislature specifically criminalized failure-to-act in its child abuse
statute, in contradistinction to the Illinois court's interpretation of its aiding and abetting
statutes. Rundle, 500 N. W.2d at 925-26.
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Rundle as a caring father, who comforted his daughter and saw to it that
she did not hurt herself,66 while Williquette was portrayed as a nonresponsive, non-caring mother. Although Rundle's conduct was more
egregious and more "overt" than Williquette's, his conviction was reversed
and hers affirmed.
Even a loving, caring mother is susceptible to being found the "cause"
of child abuse. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that failure to seek
timely medical treatment for a severely beaten child rose to the level of
cruel and inhumane conduct, which is sufficient to be the "cause" of injury.
In State v. Fabritz,67 the state court found that the mother's watching and
caring for her daughter, who appeared sick, for approximately eight hours
before seeking necessary surgical treatment which would have saved her,
"caused" her death. The court's harsh treatment of the mother is indicative
of the male-standard of motherhood. In its opinion following her habeas
corpus petition,68 the Fourth Circuit stated:
[T]he evidence is utterly bare of proof of a consciousness of
criminality during her bedside vigil. This may have been an error
of judgment, however dreadfully dear, but there was no awareness
of wrongdoing on her part. . .. Fabritz's error amounted to a
failure to procure medical attention in less than eight hours after
her arrival at home. 69
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit held that her conviction was void for denial
of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
B.

THE STRUGGLES OF SINGLE PARENTING

Failure-to-protect laws are based upon the white, middle-aged, middleclass man's notion of the traditional "American family": "[s]tudies of
judicial attitudes toward women's roles reveal a strong preference among
some judges for the traditional family of breadwinner fatherlhomemaker.,,70 The traditional concept of the "American family" is
a nuclear family comprised of wage-earner father, housewife mother, and
obedient children, as exemplified by the "typical" 1950s family, which

66. Id. at 919 (quoting a social worker's evaluation of Rundle as a parent: "it was ,almost
always Kurt that [the child] sought out to do any parental task. If she was hurt, she would
go to Kurt for comfort. If she needed something, she would ask Kurt. . .. If she was
spilling something, if she attempted to leave the room, it was Kurt that got up and tended
to her or made sure that she was not doing something dangerous").
67. 348 A.2d 275 (Md. 1975), on remand, 351 A.2d 477 (Md. App. Ct. 1976), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 942 (1976).
68. Fabritz v. Traurig, 583 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
69. Id. at 700 (citation omitted).
70. FALum, supra note 25, at 42 (women are often denied equal justice, treatment, and
opportunity due to stereotyped myths, beliefs, and biases).
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produced record rates of marriage and birth. Contemporary society
sentimentalizes the "American family," idealized in the old television series
"Leave it to Beaver" and "Father Knows Best," which portray life as much
more simple and satisfying, presumably because men and women knew
their places. In 1992, only 24% of married couples, down from 43% in
1976, fit the traditional family mold in which only the husband worked
outside of the home. 71 As defined by Axinn and Levin, "the family is the
basic organizing device of modem society and all social policy decisions
impinge on family well-being. In this sense, then, social policy and family
policy are essentially one."n
F ailure-to-protect laws should not be based upon traditional notions of
motherhood and family when the realities of the modem world sharply
differ. The widely-publicized decline in family values is actually a decline
in the number of traditional, male-headed families. The American notion
of "family" has evolved since the 1950s and laws must adjust to this
changing concept. Today's family is profoundly different from the
"traditional" family portrayed in Norman Rockwell paintings. The
traditional, nuclear family has given way to single-parent families,
nonmarital heterosexual and homosexual cohabitation, step-families, and
foster and adoptive families. 73 Of all the changes in the traditional family,
the greatest change is the move from the patriarchal to the matriarchal,
single-parent household. 74 The National Center for Health Statistics
reported that in 1990 the number of births to unmarried mothers hit an alltime high of 1,165,384 in the United States, and in 1992, 28% of babies
were born to unwed mothers,75 compared to 12% twenty years earlier.
Therefore, our legal system must consider the plethora of interrelated
problems that may circumscribe a single mother's ability to protect her
children: single parenting, work, poverty, and abuse.
Unmarried mothers generally are younger, poorer, and less educated
than those mothers who are married at the time of the birth of their

71. More Unmarried u.s. Women Are Becoming Mothers, Census Says, CHI. TRlB., July
14, 1993, § 1, at 7.
72. JUNE AxINN & HERMAN LEVIN, SOCIAL WELFARE: A HISTORY OF TIlE AMERICAN
RESPONSE TO NEED 2 (1981).
73. See generally Robert Suro, The New American Family: Reality Is Wearing The Pants,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1991, at A2; Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The
Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1640 (1991);
David Popenoe, The American Family Beleaguered; Flight From the Nuclear Family: Trend
of the Past Three Decades, 2 THE PuBLIC PERSPECTIVE, Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 28; The
Revolution in Family Life, THE FUTURIST, Sept 1990, at 53.
74. In the United States, single-parent households nearly tripled between 1970 and 1990,
rising from 3.8 million to 9.7 million. Suro, supra note 73, at 1. See also Rochelle L.
Stanfield, Valuing the Family, 24 NAT'L L.J., July 4, 1992, at AI.
75. Birth To Single Moms Hit Record, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 26, 1993, at 3.
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children and "face a constant wearying struggle to maintain a family.,,76
With the diminution of social stigma attached to unwed motherhood,
however, an increasing number of educated, professional, or managerial
women are also having children out of wedlock. 77 The complexity of a
single mother's situation does not lend itself to reductive analysis or facile
solutions:
The plight of single-parent families has become so serious and so
complex that basic changes are needed in social and economic
conditions - changes brought about by a combination of social
programs, tax policies, and economic policies. For example, these
families need "housing, day care, job training, medical, service, and
nutritional programs, safe neighborhoods, access to predictable job
markets, and an adequate income that derives from some combination of children's allowances, wages, tax rebates, and support
payments." In order to meet single parent families' needs, social
reform must look beyond traditional concerns of public welfare to
economic inequalities and to the institutional arrangements that
reinforce these inequities. 78
A second major trend changing the traditional family is the working
mother. Mothers who work by choice or by economic necessity do not
forsake the traditional role of homemaker but rather add to their responsibilities. More than 50% of all mothers with preschool children worked
outside the' home in 1991, compared to only 200/0 in 1960.79 Most of
these working women are confined to sex-segregated, low-paying job
categories,80 thus locking them into a cycle of poverty. While single
mothers of children under age six bring in an average annual income under
$7,000, annual childcare costs can range from $2,000 to $6,500. 81 Of the
one-quarter of mothers in the labor force who are single with children
under eighteen, nearly 40% do not earn enough to raise their families above

76. Tamar Lewin, Rise in Single Parenting Is Reshaping U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1992,
at AI.
77. Id. See also Carleton R. Bryant, Rise in One-Parent Families Has Some Predicting
Worst, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1992, at Al (census bureau reports that mothers headed 8.7
million single-parent families compared to 1.4 million headed by fathers). The "some
predicting worst" headline is indicative of the prevailing view that single mothers cause
innumerable societal problems.
78. Mulroy, supra note 48, at 105 (quoting BRUCE JANSSON, THE RELUCTANT WELFARE
STATE 254 (1987».
79. Families To Keep Changing, But Slower, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 25, 1992, at 5.
80. See generally FALUDI, supra note 25, at 364 (in 1988, women with college diplomas
were still only earning 59 cents to their male counterparts' dollar).
81. Mulroy, supra note 48, at 277 (citing HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 99TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., CHILDREN IN POVERTY 372 (Comm. Print 1985».
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poverty level. 82 Other single mothers rely on public assistance or child
support. These disturbing trends have caused some commentators to
recognize the "feminization of poverty. ,,83
Legislatures and courts cannot ignore the fact that poverty or fear of
poverty significantly circumscribes a mother's options in ways not relevant
to men. Women and children not only comprise the largest portion of poor
people and residents of homeless shelters but also are becoming the fastestgrowing poverty section in the United States. Nearly half of female-headed
families with children live in poverty versus only 15% of two-parent
families. 84 Family breakup is a major source of poverty, throwing most
custodial parents and their minor children into severe economic hardship. 85
Within four months of separation, household incomes of custodial mothers
plummet 37%; only half of the 58% of women with children under twentyone awarded child-support payments actually received the full amount. 86
Middle and upper-income women are not immune from the rapid descent
into poverty after divorce: one in seven such women needs public
assistance. 87 One study concluded that there is a $200-$300 difference in
the mean monthly income father-present versus father-absent households. 88
In domestic violence cases, women and children's financial dependence on
men is frequently a question of survival. The deleterious economic
consequences of divorcing an abusive husband/father cannot be dismissed
in a cavalier manner.

82. Mulroy, supra note 48, at 99.
83. See, e.g., RUTH SIDEL, WOMEN AND ClflLDREN LAST (1986); Johanna Brenner,
Feminist Political Discourses: Radical Versus Liberal Approaches to the Feminization of
Poverty and Comparable Worth, 1 GENDER & SOCIETY 447 (1987); Maxine Baca Zinn,
Family, Race and Poverty in the Eighties, 14 SIGNS 856 (1989).
84. William A. Galston, Putting Children First, AMER. EDUCATOR 44 (Summer 1992);
Mulroy, supra note 48, at 277; see also U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Family Disruption and Economic Hardship: The Short Run Picture for Children, 1991
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS no. 23 (report by Suzanne Bianchi and Edith McArthur)
(finding that fewer than half of absent fathers pay child support, making it almost twice as
likely that children of divorce parents will live in poverty than children in intact families).
85. Galston, supra note 84, at 44-46.
86. Rochelle L. Stanfield, ValUing the Family, NAT'L LJ. July 4, 1992, at 1562. See
generally LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1982); Kenneth
Labich, Can Your Career Hurt Your Kids?, FORTUNE, May 20, 1991, at 38.
87. Esther Wattenberger, Family: One Parent, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOC. WORK 548-553
(18th ed., 1987).
88. Johnson, supra note 2, at 138-39 (citing NORMAN POLANSKY, MARY ANN
CHALMERS, ELIZABETH BUTIENWISER & DAVID WILLIAMS, DAMAGED PARENTS, AN
ANATOMY OF CHILD NEGLECT (1981»; see generally 17 ANN. REv. SOC. 52 (1991).
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THE DYNAMICS OF VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY

Domestic violence is another obstacle for many mothers which is too
often discounted by those who, in hindsight, harshly judge mothers who do
not protect their children from abuse within the home. Child abuse is
viewed by some as a moral issue, to the exclusion of the economic,
emotional, legal, and physical issues involved. The complex issue of
domestic violence is seen in facile terms seemingly so obvious and
compelling that to believe otherwise is unthinkable. The complexity of
child abuse generally is compounded by the coexistence of spousal abuse.
In a series of articles chronicling the killing of children in Chicago, one
article asked these rhetorical questions:
Why didn't she get help? Why didn't she kick him out? Why
didn't she leave? If she did leave, why would she ever agree to
see him again? Those on the outside see these as logical questions,
the steps painfully obvious: 'If only she'd done this.' 'If only
she'd done that. ,89
The commonly held attitude of "I would have done ..." fails to take
into account, inter alia, that the "I" referred to is a vastly different "I" than
the one in the actual battering situation. That is, those who say "I would
have . . ." typically speak from their own non-battered experience, beliefs,
emotions, education, and socio-economic situation, rather than from a
battered woman's point of view. Furthermore, inquiries blaming women
are misplaced. More appropriate inquiries are: why did he batter?; could
she have left him?; and how could we have helped her to leave him?
Leaving the abuser often does not stop the violence. Consider that threefourths of women killed in domestic violence were separated or divorced
from their mate. 90 The leading cause of injury to women in this country
is abuse by their male partner;91 "a 1958 study found that 41 % of all
female-murder victims were killed by an intimate, such as a husband. ,,92
Other studies indicate that, typically, abuse actually escalates when a

89. Louise Kiernan, Complex Issues Trap Women in Abuse, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 16, 1993,
at AI.
90. Kiernan, supra note 89, at Al (citing several studies based on U.S. Dept. of Justice
statistics).
91. Schneider, supra note 27, at 523 (citing Women, Violence and the Law: Hearings
Before the House Select Comm. on Children, Youth and Families, l00th Cong., 1st Sess.
3 (1987) (statement of Rep. George Miller».
92. See Natalie Loder Clark, Crime Begins at Home: Let's Stop Punishing Victims and
Perpetuating Violence, 28 WM. AND MARY L. REv. 263, 285 (citing M. WOLFGANG,
PAITERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 213 (1958».
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woman attempts to sever her relationship with the abuser. 93 Lenore
Walker, a leading psychologist on battered women, calls this a "[n]o-win
situation. . .. You're in danger when you're with him and you're in
danger when you're not. That's what leads to a lot of behavior by abused
women that those of us on the outside can't understand.,,94 Between 1983
and 1987, domestic violence shelters had more than a 100% increase in the
number of women seeking refuge. 95 Almost half of all homeless women,
in the eighties, were victims of domestic violence. 96
A close nexus exists between battered women and abused children. A
recent study indicates that child abuse is found in over 50% of battering
cases.97 In many cases where a mother is convicted for child abuse
inflicted by her boyfriend or husband, the mother herself is a victim of
physical and emotional abuse at the hand of the same offender. 98 The
difficulty in analyzing many failure-to-protect cases is the absence, in court
opinions, of any discussion or even notation of whether the mother was
also a victim of abuse. 99 Only a few state statutes expressly provide
affirmative defenses for battered women, such as allowing the woman to
explain her inertia if she feared that any action to stop the abuse would
result in physical harm to herself or exacerbate the danger to the child. 100
Unfortunately for the defendant in the following case, such a defense is not
recognized in New Mexico.
In State v. Lucero,IOl the New Mexico Supreme Court held that
mistake of fact and duress were irrelevant to a charge of child abuse
because a defendant's mental state is not an element of the crime of child
abuse. 102 The mother, living on public assistance, had two children and
was pregnant with her third child at the trial. While admitting to knowing
about the abuse of her son, she testified that she only yelled at her
boyfriend to stop and did not seek help because her boyfriend threatened

93. Kiernan, supra note 89, at AI, AI6 (citing U.S. Dept. of Justice statistics and
ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BAITERED WOMEN KILL (1987».
94. Id. at A16.
95. FALUDI, supra note 25, at 8.
96. Id. at 25.
97. See Schneider, supra note 27, at 551 (citing Nancy S. Erickson, Battered Mothers of

Battered Children: Using Our Knowledge of Battered Women to Defend Them Against
Charges of Failure to Act, IA CURRENT PERSP. IN PSYCHOL. LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES
197,200 (1991».
98. See id. (study finding over 50% of battered women cases also involved child abuse).
99. Schneider, supra note 27, at 554 (citing Suzanne Groisser, Battered Women & Their
Battered Children: Criminal and Civil Allegations of the Woman's Failure to Protect 3
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York University Law Review».
100. See e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 726.6.I(e) (West Supp. 1986); Minn. Stat. § 609.378
(1984); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 852.I(a) (Supp. 1990).
101. 647 P.2d 406 (N.M. 1983).
102. Id. at 409.
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to inflict even greater harm on both her and her son. 103 She also testified
that her boyfriend beat her and once broke her jaw. 104 At trial, a
psychologist testified that the mother was under duress when she failed to
seek assistance for her child, due to her fear of her boyfriend's threat of
violence. lOS The Lucero Court rejected the duress defense and held that
the child abuse statute was a strict liability statute. 106
The fact that the mother herself is a victim of battering sometimes can
work against her in custody battles. 107 In State v. Williams, 108 an
appellate court upholding the conviction of a pregnant and severely battered
mother stated that evidence of abuse could properly have led the trial court
to find that the defendant mother should have foreseen the danger her
husband posed to others, including her child. Some judges find it so
difficult to comprehend a battered woman's sense of helplessness and
inertia that they award custody to the batterer. In Blake v. Blake I 09 , a
New York appellate court reversed the trial court's award of custody to an
abusive father based on its finding that the shelter to which the mother had
fled with her two children was unsuitable for the childrenYo The trial
judge's decision was based on the belief that a more suitable home could
be provided by the battering husband, despite the fact that he had abused
his wife for several years, often in the presence of the children. In granting
custody to the father, the trial judge ignored statistics showing that men
who batter their wives often abuse their children.
The opinions in failure-to-protect cases are notable for their absence of
any discussion of the woman's options in preventing the abuse, despite the
fact that it is her very failure to act upon these options for which she is
being penalized. Often the woman's experience is reduced to a generalized,
typified model rather than being analyzed in light of the complex factors
which might work to confine the woman to her particular situation.

103. Id. at 407 (definition states that child abuse occurs when a "person knowingly,
intentionally or negligently, and without justifiable cause ... permit[s] a child to be: (1)
placed in a situation that may endanger the child's life or health; or (2) tortured, cruelly
confined or cruelly punished.").
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 408-09.
107. See Schneider supra note 27, at 550 ("The law views battered mothers as primarily
responsible for harms to which their children are exposed. Yet, in custody battles, battered
women may lose custody of their children because they are portrayed as victims.").
108. 670 P.2d 122 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 669 P.2d 735, disapproved,
Santillanes v. State, 849 P.2d 358 (N.M. 1993).
109. 483 N.Y.S.2d 879 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
110. See id.; see also Bertram v. Kilian, 394 N.W.2d 773 (Wis. 1986) (overruling trial
court's holding that evidence of a father's abuse of his wife was irrelevant in a custody
dispute).
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III. Best Interests of Children and Mothers
Is it, in the long term, in the best interest of the child to take the nonabusive parent away from him or her? Do punitive measures against a
non-abusive parent help protect children from abuse? Are we serious about
our commitment to keeping a family together when we place the child in
foster care because her mother failed to protect her from an abuser? The
purpose of failure-to-protect laws is to prevent child abuse by motivating
the non-abusive parent to act to protect his or her child from abuse by
threatening him or her with criminal or civil liability. Failure-to-protect
laws fail, however, for two reasons. First, these laws are based on the
unwarranted assumption of control and ignore the daily oppression and
struggle in the lives of many women. Mothers who fail to act do so for
complicated logistical or emotional reasons and not because they fail to
recognize the danger or desire the danger to continue. Many mothers fail
to act because of the limited, viable, long-term alternatives available.
Rather than recognizing the limitations circumscribing a woman's conduct,
the legislature and courts have opted for an easy-to-ca1culate approach to
prosecution. This approach ignores the complicated realities confronted by
the women subject to these decisions in favor of direct action that purports
to solve the problem, regardless of the fact that the underlying problem
remains.
The second fatal flaw of failure-to-protect laws is their failure to serve
their purported purpose of looking out for the best interest of the child.
These laws deal with a fait accompli; they do nothing to help prevent the
abuse. Failure-to-protect laws are not directed toward the actual abuser and
do not motivate mothers to protect their child to any greater extent than the
absence of the threat of imprisonment. Many mothers who are aware of
the abuse of their children already have considered ways to provide a safer
environment for their children, making the threat of liability superfluous.
Thus, failure-to-protect laws punish children by taking their mothers away
from them and often requiring them to testify against their mothers before
they are placed in foster care. One commentator weighed the benefits and
detriments of punishing a parent for her failure to protect:
The detriments of making the defendant's conduct criminal,
however, outweigh the benefits. [Several] detriments appear in the
family setting. First, the mother's obligation to remove her
children from the father's control will at the very least disrupt any
remaining shreds of family harmony and, very likely, will
precipitate the dissolution of the family unit. More importantly, a
felony conviction against both parents may punish the children and
destabilize their environment by taking both parents away from
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them. While the children are doubtless safer without the abusive
father, it is less clear that they are better off in foster care than in
a single-parent home with their mother. lll
The Illinois Coalition Against Domestic Violence called these punitive
measures directed against non-abusive mothers "inappropriate, unjust and
counterproductive." I 12 The Coalition believes that the proper focus
should be on prosecuting the perpetrator of the violence, given welldocumented evidence that many mothers of abused children are themselves
victims of abuse at the hands of the same male.
A.

ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES TO PUNISHMENT

A better-reasoned approach to non-abusive mothers with mates who
abuse their children consists of two prongs. The first prong is comprised
of preventive measures that would offer realistic options to non-abusive
mothers by establishing adequate, long-term protective and supportive
services to enable women to escape their violent homes and take their
children with them to a safe environment. Any strengthening of the family
would be better derived from a policy of support, assistance, education,
training, and treatment rather than the destructive policy of punishment.
The latter policy results in irreparable harm to the mother-child relationship
held so sacred by our society. It would be absurd to argue that a prison
environment will make any parent a better parent.
The State of Missouri, commendably, is concentrating its efforts on the
prevention of child abuse. As the Missouri Director of Social Services
stated, "[0]bviously there are a million and one stories. Mom leaves the
baby with the boyfriend. Mom leaves the baby alone while she goes to
work. It all points to the need for better parenting education, better child
care education and the need to provide safe environments.,,113 Where the
mother's malfeasance stems from her inability to prevent harm to, and
protect and care for, her children, the appropriate remedy is one that
emphasizes and works on those defaults that allowed the harm. Although
these types of programs are costly, they would help to avoid costs of
prosecuting and imprisoning a mother and placing a child in foster care.
One commentator advocates pre-trial diversion for first-time, nonabusive offendersY4 Pre-trial diversion involves imposing specific
obligations on offenders and requiring successful completion of treatment
programs. Such pre-trial diversion would consist of therapy and lessons in

Ill.
112.
113.
16.
114.

Tanck, supra note 56, at 684-85.
Kathleen Quinn, Justice in Issue o/Battered Women, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 9, 1986, at 2.
Charles M. Madigan, Getting a handle on child abuse, CHI. TRIB., May 2, 1993, at
Johnson, supra note 2, at 388-390.
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parental and survival skills for the children as well as the offender. If the
parent failed to successfully complete the program or allowed her children
to fall prey to further abuse, then she could be criminally punished. 115
Pre-trial diversion does not, however, adequately assist the offender who
needs emotional, financial and actual support, assistance, education, training
and treatment in order to break away from the abuser for a sustained period
of time.
B.

REWORKING FAILURE-TO-PROTECT LAWS

The second prong of my approach is directed at failure-to-protect laws.
These laws should require consideration of various factors affecting a
woman's ability to "control" the situation to be regulated, including (1)
whether the mother herself was a victim of abuse; (2) the extent to which
she was emotionally incapable of protecting her children or suffers from
"learned helplessness;" (3) whether she was paralyzed by fear of legal
action; (4) whether she was physically or financially capable of escaping
the abuser; (5) whether she had attempted to sever her relationship with the
abuser; and (6) if so, whether severe consequences followed; and (7)
whether long-term support and assistance was available, but refused. In
addition, because the existing laws are premised on the finding that the
woman knew or should have known of the danger posed by the actual
abuser to her child, they should require that the actual abuser be prosecuted
as a predicate to finding a mother liable. As Schneider claims, "[f]ar too
few child abusers are actually prosecuted and convicted by the courts while
too many battered women face child neglect charges. ,,116 It borders on
the absurd to hold the mother liable for failing to act upon knowledge that
the abuser posed a danger when the court system itself finds that the
evidence against him is insufficient. It is too much to expect a mother to
uproot her family or eject the man she loves (the alleged abuser) and face
potential violence, homelessness, or loss of custody, when the legal system
itself does not find the evidence against the alleged abuser sufficient to
punish him. While no one factor is dispositive of a case, it would not be
overly difficult for the justice system to incorporate these factors in the

115. Illinois has a similar program regarding aggravated battery of a child. "When a
person engaged in the actual care of the victim child ... pleads guilty to, or is found guilty
of the offense of aggravated battery of a child, the court may, without entering a judgment
of guilt and with the consent of such person, defer further proceedings and place such
person upon probation upon such reasonable terms and conditions as it may require. At
least one such term of probation shall be that the person report to and cooperate with the
Department of Children and Family Services at such times and in such programs as the
Department ... may require." Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 720, para. 5/12-4.3 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
116. Schneider, supra note 27, at 552 (quoting COALITION OF BAITERED WOMEN'S
ADVOCATES, PosmON PAPER ON CHILD WELFARE 467 (Nov. 1988)}.
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same manner that mitigating factors or affirmative defenses are used in the
law.
The third factor which I have proposed, paralysis due to fear of legal
action, would include various fear tactics which are used by male abusers
to control their female partners. One common fear tactic is to threaten the
woman with the loss of custody of her child. 1I7 Unless a mother can
prove that abuse had a direct impact on the child, courts usually regard
domestic violence as irrelevant. 1I8 In January 1993, Illinois amended its
Domestic Violence Act to require that an abused woman be allowed to take
her children with her or designate where they should go if she is separated
from them.
A second fear tactic is to threaten the woman with deportation, if she
is an illegal alienY9 A woman's illegal status makes her exceptionally
vulnerable to abuse by husbands, as recognized by the amendments to the
1986 Immigration Act,120 which allows abused women to waive the Act's
two-year waiting provision. The hostility of some courts and the lack of
funding to effectively assist poverty-stricken mothers leave little question
as to why these mothers do not turn to authorities for help.

Conclusion
Many mothers who fail to protect their children are trapped between the
polarities of powerful men in the legal and political· systems and abusive
men in their personal relationships. Many of the women convicted in
failure-to-protect cases deal with their abusers on a personal, daily level.
Powerful men also influence and govern women's behavior on a daily basis
by defining, interpreting, and enforcing male-created laws.
When
confronted with the pervasive and ever-increasing problem of domestic
violence, even powerful men feel powerless and frustrated. While the
methods employed by lawmakers and abusers may differ in form, both
groups of men attempt to control a woman's behavior at some level with

117. See generally Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of
Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1041 (1991); Schneider,
supra note 27, at 19.
118. Cahn, supra note 117, at 1093 n. 276.
119. Prosecutors declined to prosecute Lorena Lopez, an illegal immigrant mother, for
failure to protect her son from her boyfriend's abuse because she herself was a victim of
abuse and her failure to seek assistance was a result of her illegal status and inability to
speak English. Lopez moved to a safe house, fearing retaliation from her paramour's
friends, and hid from her own family, who blamed her for allowing her boyfriend to harm
her son. See McRoberts, supra note 8, at 16; see also Michelle J. Anderson, A License to
Abuse: The Impact of Conditional Status on Female Immigrants, 102 YALE L. J. 1401
(1993); Schneider, supra note 27, at 535.
120. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-639, § 216, 100 Stat.
3537, 3538 (1986).
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little understanding of or care for the woman herself. Furthermore, both
groups of men fail to see that both violence against women, and children
and imprisonment of women who fail to protect, are not solutions to
problems.
Failure-to-protect laws are founded upon pervasive gender-based ideas.
As discussed above, these ideas include assumptions that good mothers are
all-providing, all-sacrificing, and all-knowing (can accurately assess and
predict a mate's violence); that abused women can leave their abusers; and
that by imposing a threat of imprisonment, women will act to protect their
children when they otherwise would not. The complexity of single
motherhood and abusive partners does not lend itself to quick and facile
solutions.
These mothers need shelters, safe houses, counselling, training, support
groups, legal services, and employment assistance that will allow them to
transcend their seemingly hopeless situations and set them on a path of
long-term self-sufficiency and thus self-determination. 121 We must stop
assuming that mothers, in all circumstances, are capable of breaking away
from their abusive male partners for any sustained period of time. To base
failure-to-protect jurisprudence on this fallacy commits injustice to the
mothers and defeats the best interest of the children.

121. See Clark, supra note 92, at 264 (citing Oppenlander, The Evolution of Law and Wife
Abuse, 3 L. & POL'y Q. 382,385 (1981) ("The law today fails to afford assaulted spouses
full protection and adequate remedies.")}.

